We should only do so understanding the view we are rejecting, with a clear sense of its rationale. Even if it is a rationale we now find difficult to accept, we do ourselves no favours if we simply lose our capacity to understand it. What I want to do here, therefore, is to attempt to recover and draw out the deep underlying issue at the heart of opposition to same-sex marriage - an issue that is not always clearly understood even by the conservative opponents of same-sex marriage, but which an older generation would have understood easily.
I hope to show that opposition to same-sex marriage is not simply irrational conservative prejudice. Hopefully this will aid mutual understanding, and may perhaps also reveal some potential common ground when it comes to the deep issues of recognition at stake for gay and lesbian people.
Marriage is an institution whose purpose is to recognise love in a substantial and socially accepted way. Marriage, that is, is about the love that seeks lifelong companionship - and that is the only thing essential to it. This view is different, in very important ways, from the understanding of marriage that was until relatively recently common coin in societies with a Christian influence.
An expeditious way to get a handle on this older understanding is through the preface to the marriage service in the Anglican Book of Common Prayer , which until only a few decades ago was read at most weddings. Marriage, it declares, is "an honourable estate," meaning that it is an "institution" which demands respect in and of itself, and not simply by virtue of the choices and sincerity of those involved.
That is, marriage as such, and not simply particular marriages, deserves respect and protection. For this reason, the preface continues, marriage is not to be entered into lightly, "but reverently, discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of God; duly considering the causes for which Matrimony was ordained. It is here that the point of difference with the view common today appears most clearly. For the preface lists three causes, or purposes, of marriage. These are:. It is important to stress that the idea is not that each particular marriage has to fulfil these purposes in order to count as a marriage - so that, for example, childless marriages or marriages where company becomes unpleasant cease to count as real marriages.
This misunderstanding lies behind the common claim that traditional marriage can no longer be defended because so many marriages end in divorce. This claim simply confuses the goal of marriage with failures to realise its goal.
Even if every marriage ended in divorce, it would still be possible to hold that that was not what marriage was meant to be like. The point of identifying three defining purposes of marriage is simply to say that marriage in its normal form is oriented towards this unique combination of good things.
This threefold combination is markedly different from our current conception, according to which we have reduced marriage to one essential feature: love of the kind that is willing to aim for lifelong companionship.
It is not that love is not involved or is unimportant for the older understanding; but simply that love does not say enough. Marriage is more particular than that. It is a unique and complex reality in human life, defined by its simultaneous natural orientation towards sexual intimacy, children and secure companionship.
And this points us to the heart of the issue. The central underlying conviction of the older view can be summed up as this: male-female marriage is a natural good that ought, therefore, to be respected. In other words, marriage cannot be reduced to a social convention. It is more like a feature of the natural world, an element of human ecology, than it is like a technological invention, something we make by our will.
It is not a product of human culture that we may freely modify, but rather a structure inherent to the world we inhabit, a basic given feature of human life, which is to be received and welcomed with gratitude and respect. Of course, decades of assault on almost every aspect of the older view have made this idea more difficult to understand.
Children are now regarded as an optional choice, equally available for married and unmarried couples. Sexual exclusivity may be seen as noble, but we have well and truly abandoned the idea that sexual expression is particularly for marriage. And although the vision of lifelong companionship remains as the heart of what still attracts people to marriage, we have largely ceased to understand the idea of sanctions or impediments for those wishing to renege on their commitments.
As a result, for many, marriage only seems to be a "traditional" cultural artefact. To think it goes deeper than that would imply that the world has a kind of inbuilt moral "weave" to it that includes marriage - an ethical ordering that offends prevailing desires and assumptions.
Yet it should be remembered that the older view is not without empirical support or intuitive credibility. There is wide and ancient cultural testimony to marriage as a basic fact of human life.
Moreover, for many people, it is eminently reasonable to believe that, as Jennifer Roback Morse puts it, "the concepts of 'Mother' and 'Father' are natural, pre-political concepts," and to conclude on that basis that male-female marriage is also something natural, and so not simply a convention to be wilfully manipulated.
Although the success of same-sex marriage would further marginalise the principle that biological parenthood is optimal, it remains an idea with obvious commonsense appeal. These, then, are among the reasons for the way that marriage was understood for many centuries, and for why it continues to be understood this way by many people - including many Christians - who are yet to be persuaded to abandon Jesus's teaching that, "from the beginning of creation God made them male and female Election analyst Anthony Green also notes that it would be unlikely that changes to the Marriage Act Cth would be dependent on the plebiscite.
There have only been three national plebiscites in Australia:. Plebiscites have been used by state governments from time to time, especially to deal with social issues, such as hotel trading hours or daylight saving.
While the kind of direct democracy implied by a plebiscite has its merits, there is debate as to whether it is the best way to resolve an issue. Australia is a representative democracy, and as such, a feature of parliamentary representative government is that laws and major policy proposals are determined by elected representatives through debate and deliberation in the parliament. As constitutional lawyer Professor George Williams explained in in relation to a proposed plebiscite on carbon tax:.
They go against the grain of a system in which we elect parliamentarians to make decisions on our behalf. By contrast, referendums and plebiscites introduce an element of direct democracy that allows people to have a say. In effect, they are an expensive opinion poll. While plebiscites have no legal effect, they can have a major political impact. They can provide a government with a mandate to proceed with a divisive policy, and can help to resolve a polarised issue when a government is unwilling to make a call.
A government lacking the courage to undertake a major reform may decide to do so when backed by the support of the people in a plebiscite. Referendums and plebiscites are different types of ballot. If the electors vote yes, and the Governor General gives Royal Assent, then the Constitution is actually changed. The rules for referendums are set out in section of the Constitution. Since Federation there have been 44 proposals for constitutional change put to Australian electors at referendums.
Only eight have been approved. The last successful national referendum was in when Australians voted to, among other things, set a retirement age of 70 for High Court judges. Each national referendum since then has failed. The High Court has already determined in the Same-sex marriage case that the federal Parliament has the power to legislate on this topic. The proposal for a referendum has not taken a clear form. However, if the proposal were to give the Commonwealth power to restrict the right of the Parliament to legislate on same-sex marriage, it would be unlikely to succeed.
Obtaining a majority of votes nationally and a majority in four states would be a high hurdle. In the unlikely event that such a referendum were successful then state and territory powers in this area would quite likely be revived and same sex marriage laws at state and territory level would again become a real possibility.
For opponents of same-sex marriage, it would be easier to defeat a plebiscite on same-sex marriage than it would be to pass a referendum constitutionally ruling out same-sex marriage. Immediate reaction to the proposal for a popular vote has been mixed including within the Coalition. The Opposition see it as a delaying tactic also pointing to its substantial cost and its potential for divisiveness.
Greens Leader Senator Di Natale says that if there is to be a popular vote it must be a plebiscite held at the next election and the question must to be drafted by Parliament rather than the Government. The numerous parliamentary committee inquiries into same-sex marriage legislation, have canvassed at great length the various arguments for and against same-sex marriage and the relevant committee reports provide an excellent summary of those arguments.
The views put to the Committee inquiry were summarised in the previous Parliamentary Library Background note and that summary still provides an accurate reflection of views on both sides of the debate. However since those Committee inquiries, the emphasis of the debate appears to have shifted with a strong focus moving to questions regarding religious freedoms. A central question now being debated is how far religious exemptions should extend for those who are morally opposed to same-sex marriage on the basis of their religious beliefs and whether an exemption should be offered to those opposed on non-religious grounds.
There is general agreement by those engaged with this debate that any change to the law should accommodate religious celebrants who would not celebrate gay weddings and as the analysis above indicates, all four Bills currently before the Parliament make some provision to protect the right of refusal by religious celebrants.
However for some, protection of religious freedom goes beyond the rights of religious celebrants to choose who they should and should not marry. Religious groups raising concerns about same-sex marriage also seek assurances about:.
In relation to marriage celebrants, one suggestion has been to extend the exemption that currently applies for religious celebrants to cover all authorised civil celebrants. As noted above the Leyonhjelm Bill does this to some extent, providing an exemption for authorised celebrants based on conscience. However that Bill excludes from the exemption state and territory marriage registrars, the rationale being that authorised celebrants in the employ of the state should not be able to discriminate.
As noted above, the Entsch Cross Party Bill rejected the idea of extending the religious exemption to other authorised celebrants. The rights of wedding service providers such as caterers and florists have been a subject of concern in overseas jurisdictions considering same-sex marriage. Of the 13 states in the United States that legislated to legalise same-sex marriage a number also provided special exemptions for marriage service providers.
For example in the state of Connecticut the law provides:. Some would say that such an exemption would need to have limits. For example, if a florist or wedding venue provider wished to exclude gay marriage business they would need to advertise their services as such.
Furthermore, providers of wedding services may already have had to address these types of issues in the past when previous changes in marriage practice may have conflicted with their religious beliefs. In relation to the concern regarding the rights of religious institutions and the possibility that education institutions could be forced to teach and recruit in conflict with their views about marriage, it may be that these issues are already addressed.
There are already some protections available which operate to protect their religious freedoms with regard to teachings on sex and sexual relationships which would also encompass teachings about marriage.
Similarly, at state and territory level there are various exceptions provided in anti-discrimination laws that provide exemptions for religious educational institutions, although these do vary from state to state.
He supports civil same-sex marriage but argues the human right of religious freedom is equally important. The Commissioner continues:. So long as we pardon the pun, marry all these traditions in one institution there will be angst about the nature of the law. If the law excludes same-sex couples, there will be injustice. If people of faith are forced to act against their conscience, their human rights will also be breached. The Marriage Act would recognise civil marriages.
A civil marriage would be defined as a union between two people voluntarily entered into for life and could be solemnised by a licensed civil celebrant. The Act would also recognise religious marriages in different religious traditions in a different section of the text. There are international examples where this has occurred, in particular the United Kingdom and South Africa, although arguably, the circumstances in those countries differ to the Australian setting.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the new law had to take account of the established Church of England with its own Canon Law regarding marriage. It has been suggested it was an inelegant and imperfect solution but revolutionary for its time and place. Marriage equality campaigner Rodney Croome is critical of both the Wilson proposal and any suggestion that same-sex marriage would be an assault on religious freedom.
It jeopardises bipartisan support for marriage equality legislation, given strong Labor, Green and crossbench support for the principles of antidiscrimination. It provides those conservatives who want to delay marriage equality with just the excuse they need: there are serious consequences to this reform that require the kind of careful consideration and detailed legislative drafting that will take many months.
As the Paper has observed, Australia has achieved a high degree of equality between the treatment of same-sex and heterosexual relationships with marriage remaining the one significant area of difference. For some, it is important to take time to ponder and consider the full implications of changing the meaning of this long established and important institution.
Overseas experience would suggest that a long and protracted discussion about the meaning of marriage, leading up to a popular vote some 18 months away, is likely to bring a passionate, robust and even strident or divisive debate within the Australian community.
To date, 21 countries allow same-sex marriage. Two countries, Finland and Slovenia have legislation allowing same-sex marriage which is yet to come into force. In Ireland, which recently had a referendum supporting same-sex marriage, legislation is yet to be introduced and passed by the Parliament. This paper is selective and focuses on same-sex marriage legislation that has been introduced in countries with a similar common law tradition to Australia—namely Canada, South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand although it is also acknowledged that some of these countries have a different constitutional framework that includes an entrenched charters of rights.
The paper also contains information on developments in France. Prior to enactment of the Civil Marriage Act , the federal Government referred a number of questions relating to the legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada. These questions concerned the legislative authority of the federal Parliament to make such a law and to its consistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Charter. In response, the Court confirmed that the federal Canadian Government had exclusive authority to amend the definition of marriage so that it included same-sex marriage.
In addition to this, the Supreme Court noted that the right to freedom of religion protected under the Charter afforded religious institutions the right to refuse to perform same-sex marriages if they felt such marriages conflicted with their religious beliefs. In its preamble, the Civil Marriage Act states that it is only by allowing same-sex couples to equally access the institution of marriage that their rights to equality without discrimination can be respected.
It also acknowledges that the availability of civil unions, instead of marriage, does not offer same-sex couples the equality they are entitled to. For greater certainty, a marriage is not void or voidable by reason only that the spouses are of the same sex. The Civil Marriage Act explicitly provides for the freedom of religion for churches and religious groups. Under the Act it is recognized that officials of religious groups are free to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with the religious views of their respective faiths.
Section 3 states:. It is recognized that officials of religious groups are free to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs. For greater certainty, no person or organization shall be deprived of any benefit, or be subject to any obligation or sanction, under any law of the Parliament of Canada solely by reason of their exercise, in respect of marriage between persons of the same sex, of the freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the expression of their beliefs in respect of marriage as the union of a man and woman to the exclusion of all others based on that guaranteed freedom.
In relation to protection of religious groups, it is of note that section 3 is similar to section 47 of the Australian Marriage Act Cth in that it provides officials of religious groups the discretion to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.
The Canadian Act contains an additional protection in section 3. In contrast, the Marriage Act Cth does not explicitly safeguard any particular rights of authorised celebrants who refuse to perform marriages.
The Law Council has suggested that such a protection could be considered for inclusion in the Marriage Act Cth. Soon after the enactment of the Civil Marriage Act CAN the focus in Canada shifted back to the provincial level, with some marriage commissioners in Saskatchewan and other parts of the country refusing to solemnize same-sex marriages on religious grounds.
Crucially, while acknowledging religious freedoms afforded under s 2 a of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom , the Court said that marriage commissioners. As such, the Court concluded that the positive effects of the amendments did not outweigh their deleterious effects and did not curtail equality rights in a way that was justifiable:. The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that freedom of religion is not absolute and that, in appropriate cases, it is subject to limitation.
This is clearly one of those situations where religious freedom must yield to the larger public interest. Marriages in South Africa are legislated for under two different Acts.
The Civil Union Act applies to both same-sex marriages and marriages between opposite-sex couples. The case of Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie was the impetus for the introduction of legislation permitting same-sex marriages in South Africa. The couple argued that the common law definition of marriage and the Marriage Act SOU excluded same-sex couples and therefore discriminated against them on the basis of their sexual orientation.
They argued that this discrimination breached their Constitutional rights to equality and dignity. In a unanimous decision, the Constitutional Court held that, to the extent that the common-law definition of marriage and the Marriage Act SOU excluded same-sex couples from marriage, they were unfairly discriminatory. Accordingly, they were unconstitutional and invalid. The Court determined that the remedy should be the issuing of a declaration of inconsistency, which was to be suspended for 12 months to give Parliament time to address the unconstitutional exclusion of same-sex couples.
The Civil Union Act SOU reiterates the rights that are protected by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa such as the right to equality before the law; the right to equal protection and benefit of the law; the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion; and protection from unfair discrimination on behalf of the state on a number of grounds including gender, sex, and sexual orientation.
Same-sex couples who wish to marry under the Civil Union Act SOU are able to choose whether they would like their union to be registered as a marriage or a civil partnership. The Act also prescribes the formal requirements for entering into such a civil union marriage and in many ways mirrors the provision of the Marriage Act SOU , which was not repealed or amended and remained open exclusively to facilitate marriage by heterosexual couples who chose not to get married in terms of the new Act.
The Civil Union Act SOU also contains a provision which allows a marriage officer to object to solemnising a same-sex civil partnership or marriage on the grounds of conscience, religion and belief. The Law Council in an earlier submission suggested that the South African Civil Union Act could be considered by the Committee in addition to the Canadian Civil Union Act as possible models for same-sex marriage legislation in Australia.
In many ways the compromise reached by Parliament — by adopting a separate Civil Union Act that nevertheless extends full marriage rights to all qualifying same-sex and different sex couples — is an inelegant one.
At the same time it might be argued that the compromise reached by a democratically elected Parliament bestows the kind of legitimacy on same-sex relationships that would have been unthinkable only ten short years ago.
Given the fact that South Africa is not a developed country and given, moreover, that attitudes towards same-sex desire amongst ordinary South Africans can hardly be described as enlightened, the adoption of legislation that now allows same-sex couples the choice of entering into a marriage seems little short of revolutionary. The Marriage Act UK which remains in operation does not define marriage as between a man and a woman, but sets out the procedure and premises where a marriage may take place.
Clergy of the Church of England or Church in Wales are not permitted to solemnise marriage of same-sex couples according to their rites. The new Act provides specifically that Canon law of the Church of England is not contrary to the general law which enables same-sex couples to marry, by virtue of providing only for marriage of opposite sex couples as Canon B30 does. The Marriage Act NZ had previously authorised but did not oblige any marriage celebrant to solemnise a marriage.
This is further reinforced by the new law which states that no religious or organisational celebrant is obliged to solemnise a marriage that would contravene religious beliefs or philosophical or humanitarian convictions of a religious body or approved organisation. Relevantly section 29 provides:.
New Zealand academic Rex Ahdar argues that the exemption for celebrants is not worded widely enough and would like the exemption to cover independent marriage celebrants. First, marriage celebrants who are "independent", that is, not members of any of the listed religious bodies, or any approved organisation, are not protected. Yet some 45 percent of marriages are conducted by these independent celebrants 23 percent are conducted by registrars at a state registry office and 32 percent by a church or approved organisation marriage celebrant.
Independent marriage celebrants are persons that "will conscientiously perform the duties of a marriage celebrant" and "it is in the interests of the public generally, or of a particular community whether defined by geography, interest, belief, or some other factor "that they be so appointed Marriage Act , s 11 3 a b.
Such persons may well have beliefs that generate a conscientious objection to SSM. It was wrong then, for the Ministry of Justice to recommend that independent celebrants be excluded from the benefit of the conscientious objection exemption in s 29 2. Ahdar also cites the example of the Anglican Church where it may eventually be decided that solemnisation of same-sex marriage is allowed. If that happened, Ahbar argues that Anglican clergy who dissent from that official line ought to be protected.
The right of religious freedom protects all who practice that faith, not just for the "orthodox" or those who happen to abide by the views of the majority of co-religionists or the pronouncements of the ecclesiastical or ruling elite. In light of this I proposed an amendment to s 29 2 :. Without limiting the generality of subsection 1 , no celebrant who is a minister of religion recognised by a religious body enumerated in Schedule 1, and no celebrant who is a person nominated to solemnize marriages by an approved organisation, is obliged to solemnize a marriage if solemnizing that marriage would contravene the religious beliefs of that celebrant.
But this change was not adopted. So, for now, the position of conservative church ministers within the mainstream Protestant denominations remains precarious. Under the US Constitution , states have the marriage law-making power.
During the period from to , 13 states and the District of Columbia legislated to permit same-sex marriage with all providing some form of religious exemption in regard to marriage. In that period same-sex marriage was also legalised in a number of other states, brought about through court decisions including state based challenges to bans against same-sex marriage.
The situation in the United States changed significantly and dramatically when on 26 June , the US Supreme Court handed down its decision in Obergefell v Hodges , [] deciding by the narrow majority of that same-sex couples had a constitutional right to marry, and that the right is protected under the 14th Amendment.
The case, Obergefell v Hodges, brought together 14 same-sex couples and two gay men whose partners were now deceased who sought to challenge the state bans on same-sex marriage in Michigan, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio. The appellants had been successful in challenging the bans in their respective District Courts but those decisions were reversed at the Sixth Circuit.
The Court ruled that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and the refusal to recognize those marriages performed in other jurisdictions violates the Due Process and the Equal Protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
There is much about the judicial reasoning in the case that would raise eyebrows among lawyers not used to the judicial activism of the liberal majority of the US Supreme Court which has long viewed the due process and equal protection clauses as a vehicle for legislating their preferred view on contested political and social issues. Other commentators suggest the outcome is not surprising noting that Obergefell is a part of a judicial path that had helped facilitate the recognition of gay and lesbian civil rights in the United States.
Much of the majority's opinion, delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, evokes visions of liberty, equality, and dignity. No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.
In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves.
Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right. But this court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us.
Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be. Individuals on both sides of the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their views.
Another of the four dissenters, Justice Alito highlighted the perils of a broad-brush judicial determination constitutionalising the right of same-sex marriage and short-circuiting the more nuanced debates which could go on in parliaments.
Further analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this paper, other than to say that commentators have seen flaws in the legal reasoning of both the majority and the dissenting judgments.
The dissenters, for both studiously ignoring recent relevant precedents and for the more serious failure of not addressing the question of whether states can refuse to recognise same-sex marriages that are valid where they are celebrated. To commentator Richard Lempert the failure to address the marriage recognition issue was bizarre:.
The issue poses special problems for the dissenters. Justice Scalia was perhaps the bluntest in making this point. But addressing the recognition issue would, on the one hand, have meant agreeing to require states to recognize some same sex marriages, or, on the other hand, acknowledging that they were choosing between the rules of two state electorates with little more to justify their choice than their personal preferences.
I expect the dissenters found the first option unacceptable because they wanted no part in the legalization of same sex marriage, while the second option would have meant that the democratic high road they claimed to be defending was no longer available. They could escape the dilemma only by ignoring their obligation to speak to an issue they had agreed to review.
This is the path they followed. The court, by intervening and deciding the issue unilaterally, has reduced the prospects of community acceptance and community compromise about the freedom of religious practice of those who cannot embrace same-sex marriage for religious reasons. Alito is right when he assumes 'that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.
There will be years of litigation now about the right of religious bodies to restrict services only to couples who marry in accordance with the institution's religious creed. It will all be nasty and hard fought. Ultimately, marriage reform generates claims for love, equality, and dignity. Such principles are powerful and important to protect. However, as marriage equality jurisprudence reflects on the evolving regulation of marriage, and the push for social acceptance more broadly, we should also be wary of claims that inadvertently exclude others.
No one should have to get married in order to have their relationship respected or to access support from the state. Love and family find expression in disparate ways. It would also be parochial to assume that marriage equality will eliminate the violence, harassment, and discrimination that sexual and gender minorities are subjected to on a daily basis.
So, feel free to wash your Facebook profile pictures in rainbow filters and campaign for marriage equality, but remember that the push for social justice goes well beyond that. Same-sex marriage has been legal in France since The legislation allowing same sex marriage was marked by fierce debate in parliament, legal challenges and massive street protests before it became law on 17 May The new law provides that marriage is contracted by two persons of different sex or the same-sex who have reached the age of Adoption by same-sex couples is also recognised under these laws in France.
As part of its official separation of church and state, French law recognises only the civil marriage. This must be performed by a French Civil Authority which includes the mayor or his legally authorised replacement, the deputy mayor or a city councillor.
In France, religious marriage ceremonies are optional, have no legal status and may only be held after the civil ceremony has taken place which can, but need not be, on the same day. For this reason, the new same-sex marriage law affects only civil marriages.
It does not make provision for accommodating religious celebrants or protecting religious freedoms. Furthermore there is no provision for marriage registrars to opt out of conducting same-sex marriages on the ground that it goes against their religious or moral belief.
Following passage of the legislation introducing same-sex marriage, a challenge was brought before the Conseil Constitutionnel constitutional court by a group of mayors opposed to same-sex marriage. Their claim was that the lack of such a clause in the law is contrary to the French constitution. The Constitutional Court in its judgment rejected this claim and held that it was not unconstitutional for public officials to be required to officiate at same-sex marriages regardless of any personal objections.
This is a contractual form of civil union between two adults same-sex or opposite-sex for organising their joint life. It brings rights and responsibilities, but less so than marriage. In a process begun in the s, de facto relationships have gradually been afforded similar rights to married relationships under Australian law. These changes were initially evident on a state and territory level, where sustained reform programs were embarked upon. Beginning in the late s, Alaska, Nebraska and Nevada amended their state constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage.
These constitutional changes were aimed at taking the issue out of the hands of judges. Amid widespread efforts in many states to prevent same-sex marriage, there was at least one notable victory for gay-rights advocates during this period. In , the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that gay and lesbian couples are entitled to all of the rights and protections associated with marriage. However, the court left it up to the state legislature to determine how to grant these rights to same-sex couples.
The following year, the Vermont legislature approved a bill granting gay and lesbian couples the right to form civil unions. Massachusetts Department of Public Health , left the legislature no options, requiring it to pass a law granting full marriage rights to same-sex couples.
In the days and weeks following the Massachusetts decision, some cities and localities — including San Francisco, CA; Portland, Ore. Television images of long lines of same-sex couples waiting for marriage licenses outside of government offices led some social conservatives and others to predict that same-sex marriage would soon be a reality in many parts of the country.
But these predictions proved premature. To begin with, all the marriage licenses issued to gay couples outside of Massachusetts were later nullified since none of the mayors and other officials involved had the authority to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples. More significantly, the Massachusetts decision led to another major backlash at the federal and state level.
In the U. Congress, conservative lawmakers, with support from President Bush, attempted to pass an amendment to the U. Constitution that would have banned same-sex marriage nationwide.
But efforts to obtain the two-thirds majority needed in both houses to pass the amendment fell short in and again in Gay-marriage opponents had better luck at the state level, where voters in 13 states passed referenda in amending their constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage. Ten more states took the same step in and , bringing the total number of states with amendments prohibiting gay marriage to So far, voters in only one state — Arizona in — have rejected a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage.
The same-sex marriage debate may have had an impact on the outcome of the presidential election. Ohio, which in was holding a referendum on a constitutional ban on gay marriage, was the state that ultimately gave President Bush the electoral votes he needed to beat Sen.
John Kerry. Bush, who narrowly won the state, opposed gay marriage and supported a federal constitutional amendment banning it.
Kerry also came out against gay marriage but opposed the constitutional ban and supported civil unions. Most of the states that approved constitutional amendments banning gay marriage are in the more socially conservative South and Midwest.
In more socially liberal states, the cause for same-sex marriage has fared somewhat better. Since , three Northeastern states — Connecticut, New Hampshire and New Jersey — have joined Vermont and passed laws authorizing civil unions. In addition, Maine, Oregon, Washington state and California have enacted domestic partnership statutes that grant many, though not all, the benefits of marriage to registered domestic partners.
In , the California legislature also passed legislation authorizing same-sex marriage — so far the only state legislature to do so. But the measure was vetoed by Gov.
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